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Abstract 
The Icelandic experience of boom and subsequent bust in the wake of the 2008 
economic crisis is an extreme example of the vulnerabilities and tough choices faced by states 
in the current global economic order. This paper will use historical analysis, international 
relations theory, and some aspects of international political economy to illustrate how the 
crisis came about, was dealt with, and the options faced by Iceland going forward as it seeks 
to re-integrate into the global economy. In so doing, this should provide a useful analysis for 
scholars seeking an interdisciplinary explanation of these myriad factors in a single source.  
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 How does one small state, floating lonesome on the edge of a giant, manage its 
relations therewith? How can a proverbial pimple engage without being engulfed? Iceland has 
been an interesting case study in this; it has provided both a what-to-do and a what-not-to-do 
in the space of a generation. It will be the goal of this paper to explain how this has been so, 
and the paths that these actions now leave open to it as it moves into a new era of 
Icelandic/European relations. From this, lessons from the Icelandic example will be offered 
for other small states, which face similar quandaries.  
 In order to accomplish this, the paper will take a chronological approach to its 
analysis. We will first take a brisk ride through the history of Iceland’s relations with Europe, 
so as to give us a historical basis. From there, we explore the boom – Iceland’s rise as a 
banking powerhouse that punched above its weight, and the bust – Iceland’s buckling like the 
knees of a battered pugilist from the blows of the FOREX market. We will then examine the 
repercussions faced, the methods with which these were dealt (especially in the case of the 
Landsbanki settlements), and how this shaped the relationship with Europe. From there we 
move to the options that Iceland faces in the future as it sets out to regain its footing in the 
international financial regulatory regime, especially as it relates to the FOREX market and 
currency exchange. We will then explore to see if there are any lessons from this bout to 
which future small-size contenders should adhere. In so doing, an interdisciplinary approach 
(historical analysis, international relations, and international political economy) should add a 
comprehensive viewpoint to scholarship on the Icelandic experience and its lessons for other 
states and actors in the global economic order.  
 
Theoretical Background 
 For this paper, the ideas will be examined through the same prisms of Realism and 
World Systems Theory as my previous work in IR, as this approach utilizes both a state-based 
and a systemic approach. (McDonald, 2014). 
 Dougherty (1997, 68) has given a six-point framework for Realist thought that will 
serve as the working definition for this paper.  These can be summed up as: 1) the state is the 
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primary actor, 2) that international systems are inherently conflictual, 3) that states have 
sovereignty – but that there exist “nevertheless gradations of capabilities”, 4)that states are 
unitary actors, 5)that states are rational actors seeking to benefit national interest, and 6) that 
national interest lays in obtaining and preserving power. It is upon these tenets which Realism 
will be defined in this paper.  
 Consequently, the operation of the international system in Realist expectation is, if not 
predictable, at least comprehendible. States, as the primary and sovereign actors, will make 
rational choices --within the constraints that they are held – that will enable them to maximize 
the power they can attain.  
 In contrast to the state centric view of Realism, the other theoretical approach to be 
used in this paper is less confined by boundaries of a geographical nature. The divisions in the 
other world-view to be used are more economic and, to a degree, cultural. World Systems 
analysis goes beyond the view of a state as a dominant, unitary, and rational actor 
(Wallerstein, 1987). The structure of the system is instead divided into core, semi-periphery, 
and periphery actors, which do not necessarily correspond with state boundaries.  
 The core, as defined by Wallerstein (1974) and Kuznar (1999), are areas in which 
elites control most wealth, technological, and military resources with which to dominate the 
system. While Wallerstein concentrates on food in his example, others have included more 
“sumptuous preciosities” to augment this work, such as Kardulias (1990).  
 In order to sustain this position, the core areas use the discounted resources and labour 
of the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974). These areas/actors, often are removed from the 
dominant core culture in the form of language, traditions, and development history. This is a 
function of “the social organizations of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability 
of some groups within the system to exploit others.” (Wallerstein 1974:349).   
 In order to bridge this divide, actors within the sphere of the semi-periphery are 
utilized (Wallerstein, 1974, Kuznar, 1999). These play the role of intermediary, and often 
feature a mix of the means and capabilities of the core states, such as educational 
opportunities and core-style institutions, while retaining peripheral characteristics in cultural 
and labour-division aspects to relegate them to their non-core status.  
 These do not necessarily have to be divided along national boundaries. In China, for 
example, Shanghai billionaire financiers share a national boundary with peasant rural farmers, 
many of whom are among the 21 million Chinese who live below the official “absolute 
poverty’ line of $90 US Dollars per year (Moyo, 2009).    
 
Iceland and Europe: Background 
 Iceland and Europe have a relationship with deep roots. From supposed original 
settlement by Irish monks, to Norwegian rule, and then long-standing Danish rule, Iceland’s 
civilization and society has its origins in Europe (Hjálmarsson , 1993). As the CIA Factbook 
describes it, Iceland is made up of “a homogeneous mixture of descendants of Norse and 
Celts 94%.” It is difficult to be much more European than that.  
 There is in fact, even a German origin to Iceland’s final steps towards independence in 
the 1940s (Hjalmarsson, 1993). Iceland had existed as a quasi-independent state since 1874, 
but had left the responsibility for its foreign affairs with the government of Denmark.  In 
1903, Iceland became an officially sovereign state, but through a “personal union” with the 
Danish king, still retained no control over its foreign affairs. The German influence on the 
process came, not through diplomacy, but through war. It was the invasion of Denmark in 
1940 that gave Iceland the final push into the foreign policy realm, but its attempted stance at 
neutrality was for naught, as the British came to set up camp shortly thereafter, soon replaced 
by the Americans (Ibid.). After the war, flush with foreign currency and Marshall Plan 
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money, Iceland set to secure its position in world affairs, most especially through becoming 
an original NATO signatory (Brittanica, 2013).   
 In modern times, the economy has continued to grow, but it has had a fluctuating rate, 
due do it makeup (Danielson, 2008). First off, it is unusually dependent upon the fluctuations 
of the fish market, with 40% of its export earnings coming from a product both unstable in 
supply and demand. This is compounded by its second large-export product – aluminum – 
also being subject to the vagaries of the international metals market, one that is also prone to 
fluctuation. Nonetheless, it was not these variables that would prove to be the undoing of the 
Icelandic economy – it was something much bigger, and much more ephemeral.  
 
Iceland: Banks and the EEA 
 Just as in the old Hebrew tale of the Golem, it was the Icelanders themselves who 
created the monster that – while aiding them in the short term – proved to be destructive in 
the end. The financial sector of Iceland was tightly regulated into the 1980s (Carey, 2009). 
All three of the main banks were government owned, and currency controls were tightly 
implemented. The economy continued on at a moderately successful rate, but maintaining a 
highly-valued currency held up the development of industries that were not related to the 
fishery. To get around this symptom of ‘Dutch disease’, Iceland entered in the European 
Economic Area in 1994. It was this that proved to be the Golem – as it created a brief 
opportunity for the society to thrive, but left massive destruction in its wake.  
 EEA membership represented a seismic shift in the design of the Icelandic financial 
sector. The three major banks very privatised over the period of time up to 2003. Alongside 
this, there was a shift in currency policy. Tight currency controls were exchanged for bands of 
acceptable fluctuation. These bands were gradually widened until, in 2001, they were 
eliminated altogether, and the Krona was allowed to float unfettered on the FOREX market.  
 These two changes would be much for any economy to handle on their own, but it 
EEA membership meant that Iceland had to conform all of its banking regulations with those 
required for membership in this organization. This meant that it was now party to a reciprocal 
branch and subsidiary arrangement with all 29 other member states (Ibid., p.6). In short, this 
meant that any of the Icelandic banks (having been recently privatized amid accusations of 
political favouritism) were now able to open branches or subsidiaries in any of the other EEA 
countries. The essential part of this agreement would prove to be this ‘or’, as there was an 
important distinction in the regulation of a branch or of a subsidiary. For subsidiaries, the 
supervisatory burden laid with the host country. Due to this, the EU Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Directive regulation stipulates that the weight of possible repayment rests upon the 
host country. For branches, however, this was not the case. Any EEA bank could open a 
branch in another member country and still have its regulators – and deposit insurance 
scheme – situated in Iceland. This quirk of the law would prove to be a contentious point in 
the tumultuous times that lay ahead for Iceland’s banks, and the EEA countries in which they 
were to establish branches.  
 
2008: Meltdown 
 Everything was fine until it wasn’t. In 2008, the storm clouds gathered, and then 
unleashed a hellstorm that decimated this new-look Icelandic economy in the blink of a 
historical eye. It didn’t originate in Iceland, and one could even say that the Icelandic banks 
were sustainable without the foreign shock, but one could also say that Titanic floated very 
well without icebergs – this does not absolve the decision not to carry enough lifeboats.  
 On 15 September 2008, US financial services firm Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy protection (Sorkin, 2010). The Dow Jones dropped 500 points in just that day, but 
for the purposes of this paper, that is not the crucial point. Financiers and regulators 
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everywhere were afraid of other collapses; industry giants such as Merrill Lynch (who had 
long been pegged as the next-most likely to fail after Lehman) and Wachovia (who had to 
immediately cover about $500million in Lehman assets contained just in its ‘Evergreen 
Investments’ hedgefund) were all looking dangerously unstable.  
 More importantly for Iceland, the exposure was not just limited to Wall Street (Ibid.). 
Japanese giant Mizuho Trust and Banking was forced to write down 11.8 billion yen in lost 
loans to Lehman. The Royal Bank of Scotland faced more than one and a half billion in 
unrecoverable loans to the same. The contagion was spreading – and it would manifest itself 
through one symptom that would be near-fatal to the Icelandic economy: an unwillingness to 
give short-term credit.  
 Credit Default Swaps are the lifeblood of the ‘shadow banking system’, which is the 
actual circulatory system of the global economy (Carey, p,32; Krugman, 2010). They allow 
the giant banks of the world to exchange huge amounts of capital overnight, and thus keep 
meeting short term obligations as riskier long-term obligations accumulate. The problem in 
September 2008 was that, given the prevalent threat of institutional collapse, this overnight 
lending dried up instantly. Thus, the financial crisis of 2008 for Iceland was actually more of 
a liquidity crisis, but it still hit home.  
 The economy imploded. The stock market dropped 90% of its value (Bloomberg, 
2012). Inflation increased to 18%, and unemployment rose ninefold. The government took 
control of the second and third largest banks on 7 October, and then the next day had to take 
control of the largest. The IMF had to come in with a bail-out loan of $2.1 billion USD, the 
fund’s first loan to a Western nation since 1976 (BBC, 2013). It imposed strict currency 
controls, and, amid egg-pelting protests in the streets, the government resigned. The fallout 
did not end domestically, either, as the UK government of Gordon Brown invoked harsh 
‘Anti-Terrorism’ legislation to freeze all UK assets of Icelandic bank branches, calling 
Icelandic policy “effectively illegal”. 
 
Causes of Collapse  
 It was, as the scholars put it, “the predictable end of a non-viable business model.” 
(Baldwin, 2008, p.1)  
 There are myriad reasons as to why the Icelandic economy bit the dust in the 
aftermath of the chaos on Wall Street in 2008. There was a rapid expansion in the level of 
household and non-financial corporation debt (Carey, p. 21) An overheated labour market 
was fed with high levels of immigration, making it harder to sustain full employment. High 
demand for housing led to equity borrowing that increased general exposure, and the list goes 
on. For the purposes of this paper, though, it will be best to focus on the design of the banking 
industry, as this is the part that, through the EEA, was most linked with the EU. The collapse 
will also be examined through the above-presented lenses of Realism and World Systems 
Theory.  
 The Icelandic banks were not over-extended in terms of credit – by the loose relative 
standards of their global competitors. Danielsson, in fact, stated that “Icelandic banks were 
better capitalized and with a lower exposure to high-risk assets than many of their European 
counterparts.” (p.11) This is not to say, however, that these banks were prudently run.  
 As was stated above, there was controversy about the manner in which the Icelandic 
public banks were privatised. They were predominantly sold to local investor groups, against 
the misgivings of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME in Icelandic) (Carey, p.6) The 
sale was largely seen as a political decision, had ramifications in the outlook of the bank’s 
investment portfolios, as the new owners were not traditional commercial bankers, per se. As 
Carey quotes from the Janarri report – commissioned in the aftermath of the crises to improve 
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regulation of the financial sector – the new owners had “the mindset of investment bankers, 
which favoured a strategy of rapid growth and highly leveraged, aggressive deals.” (Ibid.) 
 In a classic example of sticking to what one knows best, these so leverage-inclined 
pushed the Icelandic banking sector to unprecedented levels of immersion in – and exposure 
to – the world economy, especially the shadow banking system. These ‘new’ banks set out on 
a course of daring that would have perhaps even shaken the heads of their Norse ancestors. 
The banks would borrow large amounts of money in foreign capital markets, loan the money 
to Icelandic investment companies (often controlled by the same majority shareholders as the 
banks), who would then use this money to buy stakes in other foreign firms. This hat trick of 
market exposure created profit as long as credit was forthcoming, but the level of foreign 
exposure became high even by modern banking standards. As Carey (p. 8) notes, Iceland’s 
International Investment Position (IIP) spelled out the results of such a strategy. Net external 
debt increased by 142% in the four year bloc leading up to 2007, and net equity assets rose by 
99%. The rise in equity assets by itself would of course not be a bad thing, especially if it 
resulted from revaluation of internal assets, but that was not the case here. It instead 
represented foreign assets purchased with foreign money denominated in foreign currency – 
an ominous hat trick for a relatively small economy. Indeed, these levels represented, by far, 
the highest levels of any OECD country, most of whom had been investing abroad for 
decades, not a few years like the banks of Iceland.  
 This exposure came home to roost quickly once the crisis hit. The cost of credit 
default swaps exploded, and then they became unavailable altogether (Sorkin, p.429). As the 
‘assets’ (i.e. debts) of Icelandic financial institutions had reached almost ten times the size of 
the Icelandic GDP, investors worldwide knew that trouble for the banks meant trouble for the 
economy, and thus the value of the Krona crashed (Danielson, p.11). This made the potential 
repayment of foreign currency denominated loans even more difficult, and thus unlikely, 
leading to a run on the banks as investors and depositors tried to salvage as much of their 
assets as they could. Trading was halted, the banks were nationalized, currency controls were 
implemented, but the damage was already done. Iceland’s economy had been wiped out by 
this hat trick of market exposure, and it was going to be a painful road back. This was 
exacerbated by the fact that one of these banks – Landsbanki – had opened branches in the 
UK and the Netherlands, and had taken on deposits of more than 4 billion Pounds 
(Economist, 2013).  
 
Landsbanki – Troublemakers, Terrorists? 
 Landsbanki were adroit in exploiting the ‘branch’ loophole in the EEA agreement that 
was discussed above. Through an online subsidiary (also registered in Iceland) known as 
Icesave, it offered high-interest savings accounts to UK and Dutch depositors, offering higher 
return on savings to depositors from these nations while avoiding the regulatory gaze 
associated with their markets.  
 Once the run on the banks started, Landsbanki, of course, was overextended. The 
repayment totals would have amounted to a staggering $17,000 per Icelander (WSJ, 2013). 
Once the bank was nationalized, the government declared that they would not repay foreign 
depositors. The UK and Dutch governments paid the amounts to their domestic affected, and 
then took Iceland to the EFTA Court to sue for damages – alongside the UK’s punitive anti-
terror legislation, there have been whispers of the Netherlands blocking any future EU 
membership for Iceland.  
 This year, the EFTA has ruled in favour of Iceland, absolving them of further 
responsibility in the matter outside of normal liquidation of a bankrupt asset. This selloff of 
assets should cover most of the cost, so the financial impact of the ruling is not as severe as it 
was first thought to be, but it does reveal a regulatory hole that needs to be closed.  
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IR Lessons 
 So how then, does the Icelandic experience fit into the international order? This 
question will now be examined, through the two schools of thought presented above.  
 
Realism 
 Iceland is a small player who tried to run with the big boys, a realist thinker would 
likely say. Other countries could support banks that got in over their heads – Iceland simply 
could not. Moreover, because of their small size and influence, their institutions were shut out 
of the credit default swap market, as other institutions could not place faith in Iceland’s 
ability to back its institutions.   
 The same goes for Iceland’s currency problems. No one was going to lend Iceland 
money in a bit-player currency like the Krona, thus it had to increase its exposure by 
borrowing in another currency. Thus, trouble in the Icelandic economy became a vicious 
cycle – lower confidence in ability to honour debt led to higher default swap rates, leading to 
higher debt loads, which meant that their size relative to GDP increased, which lowered 
confidence in the Icelandic economy as a whole, which led to depreciated value for the 
Krona, which in turn increased the cost of repayment, starting the whole process over again. 
There was simply no way for a small state to pay its way of crisis in the manner that a large 
state that borrowed in its own currency such as the USA could.  
 It is interesting to note, in a realist perspective, the decline of former power-players 
like the Netherlands and the UK in this affair, but it is not related to the central theme of the 
paper.  
 
World Systems Theory 
 It would seem, in a world systems point of view, that Iceland is suffering the role of 
the semi-periphery. It models the behaviour of the core, yet is perpetually unable to enjoy the 
same sustained benefits of the system in the manner that core actors do. It emulates their 
institutions, but the global power-balance is set up such that the dominant core remains 
dominant; the semi-peripheral states are given the institutions to facilitate ‘exchange’ with the 
core, but never the control of enough resources so as to facilitate a transition to core status.  
 There is a potential positive development here, though, from a World Systems 
perspective. Normally, these core/periphery relations do not stop at the water’s edge; these 
relationships are usually present in domestic affairs as well. In Iceland, however, the 
presumed impunity of the core actors has met a wall of resistance. Voters twice rejected 
proposed Landsbanki repayment deals in referenda, and there has even been some 
prosecution of those core members deemed responsible for the maelstrom, with former chiefs 
of two of the banks having been indicted and standing trial (Bloomberg, 2012). Iceland’s 
thumbing of its nose against the norms of the system – austerity for the periphery, impunity 
for the core – would surely be seen as a welcome development for a World Systems devotee.  
 
Epilogue: Moving Ahead as an Example? 
  “For a country that four years ago plunged into a financial abyss so deep it all but 
shut down overnight, Iceland seems to be doing surprisingly well,” opined the New York 
Times’ Sarah Lyall in 2012. In this assessment, she is not alone. The indicators are strong: 
unemployment is at 6% and falling, and the economy is expected to grow by 2.8% for fiscal 
year 2012.  How then, has Iceland carried on, where others have failed? 
 First of all, it did not succumb to pressure to over-insure the private debts that other 
small states have swallowed to poisonous effect. Ireland took a different tack, and the results 
are not as encouraging. Ireland guaranteed the obligations of its banks to “a reckless degree, 
wrecking the country’s public finances.” (Charlemagne, 2013) Ireland’s tax payers will be on 
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the hook for this debt for years to come, while Iceland is already moving ahead, with half of 
the jobless rate of Ireland, and healthier deficit, debt, and credit default swap rates than its 
Celtic compatriot.  
 It does, however, have at its disposal a tool that many small states have lost – an 
independent currency. The devaluation of the Krona – while difficult on imports in a northern 
island nation – has allowed for a quicker recovery of the export sector (Lyall). This is an 
option that other small states, such as this year’s crisis-child – Cyprus, would surely enjoy 
having in their toolbox of fiscal and monetary repair. Also, the Icelandic government had a 
small debt ratio going into the crisis, having paid down debt in the boom of the 2000s (Carey, 
p.28). This allowed it to have a more sustainable outlook going forward when seeking new 
debt, and thus receiving lower rates. Indeed, Iceland is already ahead of schedule on its 
repayment of international obligations taken on during the crisis (Lyall).  
 As for what happens next with Iceland, the answer is unclear. The debate will largely 
centre on the choice of currency (Valmardsson, 2012). The most obvious choice for many 
would be entry into the Eurozone. As it is already an EEA member, Iceland has already 
conformed to much of the legislation that the EU requires for membership (as an aside, the 
rules that led to the Landsbanki ‘branch’ situation have also been amended). EU and 
Eurozone membership would allow it to “cooperate with EU countries as a sovereign nation, 
which has a say in the decision and policy making in all fields of cooperation,” according to 
Prime Minister Johanna Sigurdardottir (Ibid.).  
 This is not the only option, though. Some have made the suggestion of adopting the 
use of the Canadian dollar as an official currency (Icelandic Review, 2013). There is logic to 
the argument, as both have large export sectors (including fishing and aluminum industries), 
and that the Canadian dollar has been stable throughout the crisis and has a similar outlook 
going forward. The downside though, is that almost 80% of Iceland’s trade goes to the EU, 
not to Canada, so efficiencies there would be lost.  
 There are questions about either course of action that persist, though. Perhaps Iceland 
should maintain its trend-bucking ways and hold on to ‘the world’s smallest independent 
currency.”(Ibid.) Indeed, as Bloomberg editors asked in September 2012, “Why would 
Iceland want to join (the Euro) now? Euro-member nations such as Greece and Ireland offer 
testimony to the risks of being yoked to a currency along with stronger economies.” There 
would be pains associated with removing the capital controls in a country that imports a great 
deal of its products for domestic consumption. Would these be any worse than the losses of 
policy autonomy (especially in the fishery) and the monetary flexibility that Euro inclusion 
requires? It is not an easy question to answer. Similarly, the Canadian dollar is relatively 
steady, but it is steady at a high value, and could potentially rise higher (depending on 
resource prices and other factors) – thus affecting the exports upon which Iceland has rebuilt 
its economy. Perhaps the best option would be for Iceland to maintain its own currency while 
joining the eleven EU states in their transaction tax regime (McManus, 2013). This would 
allow Iceland to retain maximum sovereignty, while providing both revenue and a 
disincentive for investors to flee the Krona. Iceland has weathered the storm, and the option 
of joining the Euro has only gotten dimmer in light of the Cypriot mess. Perhaps maintaining 
the Krona while joining the Transactions Tax regime would be the best way to ensure that it 
keeps the all the tools it needs to navigate the choppy waters ahead, and thus chart a course 
for other small states that sail the same seas.  
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